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ABSTRACT 
This report  p resents  the resu l t s  of fa i lure  analysis performed 
on a group of monolithic integrated circui ts  obtained f rom industry. 
devices tested were defective and had been rejected.  The purpose of 
this  study was  to determine the most  prevalent fa i lure  modes and/or  
causes  of rejection of monolithic integrated circui t ry ,  and to develop the 
capability of performing failure analysis  of these devices.  
The 
The experiment showed the grea tes t  causes  of fa i lure  to  be 
(1) bonding and (2 )  open o r  shorted aluminum interconnects.  
fa i lure  causes  found were: too thin a layer  of silicon step-up o r  s tep-  
down, poor adherence of aluminum to the silicon, fa i lure  to remove all 
surface contaminants, chipped dice,  poor mask  alignment, and defects 
in both the silicon mater ia l  and the mask.  It w a s  determined that proper  
fa i lure  analysis  could reveal over 90 percent  of the fa i lures  encountered. 
Other 
This  analysis w a s  performed under the support r e sea rch  task 
"Quality Control Requirements f o r  Integrated Circuits,  Pro jec t  Number 
125-2 1-03 - 11 00". 
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GLOSSARY 
DIE - A single substrate  on which a l l  the active and passive elements 
of an  electronic c i rcui t  have been fabricated utilizing the semi -  
conductor technologies of diffusion, passivation, masking, photo- 
r e s i s t ,  and epitaxial growth. 
for  use until it is packaged and provided with external  terminals .  
A die (a l so  called a chip) is not ready 
DICE - More than one die o r  chip. 
F A I L U R E  CAUSE - The nature  of the actions which caused the fai lure  
mechanism phenomenon to occur. 
FAILURE INDICATOR - The observed charac te r i s t ic  which te l ls  that 
an  i tem is defective. 
FAILURE MECHANISM - The nature of the phenomenon which produced 
the failure mode discrepancy. 
FAILURE MODE - The nature  of the product discrepancy from which 
the observed failure indicating charac te r i s t ic  direct ly  resulted.  
INTEGRATED CIRCUIT - The Electronic Industries Association defines 
semiconductor integrated circui t  a s  "the physical realization of a 
number of electronic elements inseparably associated on o r  within 
a continuous body of semiconductor mater ia l  to perform the functions 
of a circuit". 
MONOLITHIC - Also called "Single Stone", a single flat-surfaced die 
o r  chip of silicon onto which patterns may be drawn, scr ibed,  
diffused, etc. ; the resu l t  being a single die o r  chip of mater ia l  
whichhas t rans is tors ,  diodes, r e s i s t o r s ,  and capacitors formed on 
its surface.  
SUBSTRATE - The physical mater ia l  upon which a c i rcu i t  is fabricated. 
Used pr imari ly  for mechanical support  but may s e r v e  a useful 
thermal  o r  e lectr ical  function. 
THERMOCOMPRESSION BOND - A process  involving the application 
of heat  and p res su re  to a highly conductive fine w i r e  in a metalization 
and/or  external lead a r e a  to provide an electr ical  path for external  
st imuli  o r  cur ren ts .  
WAFER - A sl ice  of semiconductor mater ia l  f rom which dies o r  chips 
are  formed. 
vi  
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SUMMARY 
A group of monolithic integrated circui ts  was obtained f rom 
industry.  The circui ts  obtained were  defective and had been rejected.  
These circui ts  were  subjected to fa i lure  analysis  to determine the most  
prevalent fa i lure  modes and/or  causes  of rejection, and to develop the 
capability of performing failure analysis of these devices.  
The experiment showed the grea tes t  causes  of fa i lure  to be 
(1) bonding and ( 2 )  open o r  shorted aluminum interconnects.  
fa i lure  causes found were: too thin a l aye r  a t  a silicon step-up o r  
stepdown, poor adherence of aluminum to the silicon, fa i lure  to remove 
all surface contaminants, chipped dice,  poor mask  alignment, and 
defects in both the silicon mater ia l  and the mask. 
that proper  fa i lure  analysis could reveal  over 90 percent of the fai lures  
en c oun t e r e d . 
Other 
It was determined 
SECTION I. INTRODUCTION 
The rapid application of microcircui t ry  to space sys tems prompted 
an investigation into the quality assurance  aspec ts  of integrated circui ts .  
The investigation reported herein was directed toward the fai lure  analysis 
of rejected devices f rom industry.  This report  p resents  no information 
which would indicate the reliability of the devices o r  which would indicate 
process  yields. The study does,  however, indicate that the majority of 
causes  f o r  rejection a r e  quality fa i lures  as  opposed to t ime dependent 
failure s . 
Note that the devices which were  studied were  rejected by industry,  
and no conclusion should be drawn as to the reliability of the par t icular  
devices.  
A group of monolithic integrated circui ts  was obtained f rom 
industry.  
defective and incapable of meeting specification requirements  and were  
rejected by industry. 
The devices supplied were  "line r e j ec t s ,  ' I  i .  e.  they were  
Individual i t ems  and their  associated defects were  not identified, 
therefore it became necessary  to conduct complete fa i lure  analysis  p ro -  
cedures  within the capability of the laboratory.  
The purpose of this  study w a s  to  (1) determine,  i f  possible , the 
most  prevalent fa i lure  modes and/or  causes  of rejection of monolithic 
integrated circui t ry ,  and ( 2 )  develop the capability of performing fai lure  
analysis  of these devices.  
SECTION 11. TESTS PERFORMED 
A .  TESTITEMS 
The tes t  i t ems  were  monolithic integrated circui ts  manu- 
factured and rejected by industry. It w a s  decided a t  the beginning of the 
program that a better and more  complete picture of fa i lure  modes could 
be obtained by procuring a group of known defective units which failed 
to meet  specification requirements ra ther  than procuring functional 
devices and inducing failures.  
a l a t e r  date. 
supplied as  such. 
This la t te r  concept will be pursued a t  
Thus, all the devices had some inherent defect and were  
2 
R 
TYPE LOGIC FUNCTION 
DTL NAND Gate 
R T L  NOR Gate 
DTL Flip Flop 
R T L  Flip Flop 
The i tems  subjected to analysis a r e  presented in  table 1. 
SAMPLE SIZE 
71 
66 
77 
75 
 
I RTL 
Table 1. Items Subjected to Analysis 
'  
- 
The causes of rejection of the devices were  not supplied by 
industry.  This necessitated a complete analytical procedure.  All 
devices were  monolithic integrated circui ts  fabricated basically f rom 
a silicon s t ructure  and by diffusion techniques. 
p rocesses  and techniques a r e  basically the same for  a l l  devices investi-  
gated and a r e  fa i r ly  representative of those used by industry. 
The manufacturing 
The interconnection system of these par t icular  devices is an 
aluminum -aluminum system and an  aluminum -gold system. 
par t icular  sys tems consist of aluminum thin film deposited on the s i l i -  
con. 
usually by thermo-compression bond techniques. 
generally enclosed in a ceramic hermetically sealed package to protect 
the devices f rom contamination. 
These 
Gold o r  aluminum leads a re  then bonded to the aluminum thin fi lm 
The silicon chip is 
B. FAILURE ANALYSIS PROCEDURE 
The basic approach to evaluation and analysis of the devices 
Note that a maximum of nondestructive testing was is shown in figure 1. 
performed p r io r  to performing any destructive tes t s .  
C. VISUAL EXAMINATION 
Visual examination with the unaided eye was performed 
upon receipt of the components. Additional microscopic inspection a t  
30X was performed in an effort to detect  g r o s s  defects such as missing 
leads ,  cracked cases ,  and improper index marking. 
3 
D. PERFORMANCE TESTS 
Performance tes t s  were  conducted on the devices which 
were  susceptible to this type of test .  
functional leads; therefore a complete functional tes t  could not be 
performed. 
Several  devices exhibited missing 
Electrical  functional t e s t s  were  selected in  such a manner a s  
Verification of to verify the operational charac te r i s t ics  of the units. 
logic functions and status parameter  t e s t s  w e r e  performed on a DC 
Integrated Circuit Tes te r  . 
SECTION III. DETERMINATION OF FAILURE INDICATORS I 
Subsequent to  the electr ical  parameter  measurement  and 
nondestructive tes t s ,  the case of each unit was carefully removed to 
facil i tate internal investigation. The monolithic chip and all in te r  - 
connections were then accessible  for  microscopic observation; and, 
such manufacturing process  deficiencies a s  inadequate lead bonding, 
improper  handling, erroneous regis t ra t ion,  and improper  index 
markings could be easily observed. 
SECTION IV. RESULTS 
A. DTL NAND GATE 
The resu l t s  of the visual inspections and electr ical  t e s t s  
a r e  shown in Table II. 
were  defective and provided the fai lure  indicator f rom which subsequent 
analysis proceeded. 
These t e s t s  pr imar i ly  verified that the units 
Note that 14 of the units appeared to be non-failures. 
Microscopic examination of the opened units revealed the failure 
During this phase of the mechanisms and causes a s  shown in Table III. 
investigation it became apparent that  many of the devices that were  
thought to be DTL NAND were  in  reali ty DTL power NAND o r  a c i rcui t  
that had 1126, which bore no resemblance to  the original c i rcui t  printed 
on the die. 
code and subsequently verified by electr ical  tes ts .  
character is t ics  of the three  types of devices a r e  different, 
were  labeled internally, they were  re jec ts  on an electr ical  parameter  
tes t  basis .  
This w a s  discovered initially by observation of the chip 
Since the e lec t r ica l  
and the devices 
Note that the majority of defective units can be categorized a s  
quality fa i lures ,  which a r e  those fa i lures  'caused by human e r r o r  and/or  I 
VISUAL L-,l 
CASE 
REMOVAL 
4 
Results Tabulated I TEST 
1 X-RAY 
MICROSCOPIC 1 EXAM Results Tabulated 
F igure  1. Fa i lu re  Analysis Procedure 
Table 11. Determination of Fa i lure  Indicators 
F o r  DTL NAND Gates 
DEFECTS 
Input either Shorted 
o r  Open 
T r an si s to r 
Open 
T ran  si s tor 
Shorted 
output o u t  of 
Tolerance 
Wrong Circuit 
in Capsule ( 1  126)  
Leaking 
T r an  si s to r : 
Unit appeared 
To Be Good 
NUMBER OF UNITS 
4 
7 
11 
23 
19 
15 
DC 
TEST 
METHOD 
4 
7 
11 
2 3  
0 
15 
14 
MICROSCOPIC 
INSPECTION 
~~ 
1 :: ::: 
2 ::: : 
5 : :: 
0 
19 
0 
43 
:: D C  Test of units with 1126 circuit  made unit appear  to have 
leaky t ransis tor .  
Verification of DC Test  made by Microscopic Inspection. .*, .b *,. r,. 
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improper quality control. This category of fa i lure  includes (a )  im-  
proper  process tool use resulting in s c a r r e d ,  chipped, and cracked 
substrates ,  (b )  improper packaging such a s  erroneous regis t ra t ion 
and misindexing, and ( c )  poor lead bonding. 
Scarred dice a r e  shown in figures 2 and 3 .  Note the gouging of 
the die surface due to operator  mishandling. 
caused by smearing of aluminum. 
the function of one of the t rans is tors  within the circuit .  F igure  3 shows 
an open circuit due to a tool sc ra tch  a c r o s s  aluminum interconnects. 
F igure  2 shows a shor t  
This shor t  has  completely eliminated 
Figure 4 shows a chipped die causing an  open circuit .  Note 
that the silicon i s  completely removed f rom a contact. 
extremely rough t reatment  w a s  experienced. 
Obviously 
Figure 5 depicts a poorly bonded lead. The bond i s  a thermo- 
compression stitch type, and it i s  obvious by the tooling impressions 
that a t  least  three attempts were  made to accomplish this bond. 
B. RTL NOR GATE 
The resul ts  of the visual inspection and electr ical  t es t s  
a r e  shown in Table IV. 
for  improper indexing. 
m a r k  on the case  in the upper right-hand corner .  
was established by removing the case of a unit and tracing the circuit .  
Although the erroneous indexing w a s  discovered, the analysis proceed- 
ed a s  i f  the units were  properly indexed. 
s idered during the test. 
were  well within tolerance l imits  and performed correct ly .  
It w a s  assumed that the units were  rejected 
Note that 100 percent of the units had the 
Improper indexing 
This discrepancy was con- 
The electr ical  t e s t  indicated that a l l  units 
Microscopic examination of the opened units revealed seve ra l  
types of probable fa i lure  mechanisms. 
dicators  one can assume that the mechanisms might manifest  them- 
se lves  a s  fa i lures  a t  some future t ime. 
had such mechanisms as mentioned in the DTL NAND gate description. 
These mechanisms were caused mainly by improper quality control. 
This category includes (a) improper  process  tool use resulting in 
s c a r r e d ,  chipped, and cracked substrates ,  (b)  poor cleanup of etchant, 
Since there  were  no fa i lure  in- 
Note that a majority of the units 
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and ( c )  poor lead bonding. 
ea r l i e r  is shown in figure 6. 
could cause a poor thermocompression bond, result ing in an inter-  
mittent failure. As in DTL NAND, these s c a r s  a r e  a l so  due to operator  
mishandling. Figure 7 shows inconsistencies in deposit thickness, which 
a r e  probably due to improper control of deposition process .  
A s c a r r e d  die s imi l a r  to those discussed 
The ar row points to a Smear which 
When all of the etchant is not cleaned off the dice,  o r  mois ture  
is allowed to contact the dice, the process  of delayed etching takes 
place a s  shown in figure 8. Another type of chemical process ,  not 
pictured here,  i s  a metall ic interaction between gold and aluminum. 
This causes  a highly res i s t ive  compound called purple plague. The 
interaction is accelerated by high temperature.  
A crack in the substrate  a t  a t rans is tor  can be catastrophic but 
is not a s  serious in the a r e a  of passive elements. This phenomenon 
i s  seen in figures 9 and 10; the electr ical  t e s t s  of these units showed 
them to be good. 
Figures 11 and 12 show passive elements that were  not linearly 
symmetr ic ,  which would cause variations in the values of res is tance 
in the item. These variations a r e  caused by improper  processing of 
diffusion masks.  
C. DTL F L I P  FLOP 
The resul ts  of the different phases of the analysis were 
correlated and then tabulated in Table V. Note that 66 of the units had 
the same failure indicator, and, of the 66, 44 had the s a m e  fai lure  
mode. 
In almost every instance the microscopic examination yielded 
a failure mode for each indicator. Some of the modes found were: 
(1) etchant on die, ( 2 )  interconnecting lead bonds not completely on 
pads, and ( 3 )  leads that were  open o r  shorted. 
fur ther  broken down into indicators, modes, mechanisms,  and causes  
in Table VI. 
The fai lures  were 
Figures 13 and 14 present  e r r o r s  caused by a faulty mask o r  
mask positioning. 
f igure 13 was covering l e s s  than half of the bonding pad. 
diodes in figure 14, which have a common lead, had each end of this 
lead bonded to two layers  of different heights; thereby shorting the 
diode to a lower layer  of the circuit. 
Notice that the aluminum lead in the middle of 
The two 
10 
Table V. Determination of Fa i lu re  Indicators 
F o r  D T L F l i p  Flop 
FAILURE 
INDICATOR 
Input Gates not 
Ef f e cting Correc t  
output 
Output Having . 
Low Voltage 
Level 
Input Appeared 
Open o r  Shorted 
No  Output 
Output Triggered 
in  Wrong Place  
NUMBER O F  
UNITS WITH 
DEFECTS 
66 
4 
5 
2 
2 
FOUND B Y  
DC TEST 
66 
4 
5 
2 
2 
VERIFIED B Y  
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There w e r e  severa l  mechanisms which indicated improper  
Figure 16 shows damage that was 
handling of the die. 
t r ans i s to r  and a r e s i s t o r  a rea .  
probably caused by improper  u s e  of a microprobe o r  a tool used to 
position the die. 
Figure 15 shows a die that w a s  cracked through a 
Another se r ious  problem found was the double bonding of input- 
output leads. F igure  17 shows a lead that w a s  broken off and another 
bonded next to i t ,  while figure 18 shows a bond in which the aluminum 
and p a r t  of the insulation below i t  were  torn away ;  thereby shorting 
the pad to the lower layers  of the die. 
The last s e r i e s  of pictures presents  units which had been subjected 
to alumina hydration and chemical degradation. F igure  19 clear ly  shows 
a case  where mois ture  o r  the etchant used on the die was not completely 
removed. 
to contact an aluminum lead thereby eating the aluminum lead in half. 
F igure  21 shows alumina hydration taking place on the aluminum. 
Figure 20 presents  the case  where an etchant has  been allowed 
D. RTL FLIP F L O P  
It was discovered by the e lec t r ica l  t es t  that only three  of 
these units were  RTL flip flops; the rest  w e r e  either counter adapters  
o r  RTL gates. 
counter adapters  and RTL gates were shown by the electr ical  t e s t s  to 
be good. No analysis w a s  performed on these units because there  were  
not enough of the RTL flip flops to reveal  any trends,  and the good units 
were  saved for future use  in accelerated life tes ts .  
All of the RTL flip flop units were  fai lures ,  but the 
SECTION V. ANALYSIS O F  RESULTS 
It w a s  concluded from the analysis of the DTL NAND gate that: 
31.070 Failed because of improper  tooling 
32.470 Failed because of improper  packaging 
26.8% Failed because of improper  c i rcui t  values 
19.7% Appeared to be good 
If these percentages were totaled, the sum would be m o r e  than 
This would be t rue  because some units had m o r e  than one 100 percent.  
fa i lure  cause. 
13 
It was concluded f r o m  the analysis of the R T L  NOR gate that: 
100 percent failed because of misindexing, and the following 
percentages had these possible fa i lure  mechanisms. 
46.870 Appeared to be good 
28.8% Had s c a r r e d  dice 
13.6%. Had cracked subs t ra tes  
7. 570 Had linearly unsymmetric r e s i s to r  pat terns  
6. 0% Had etching damage 
3. 0% Had non-uniform re s i s to r  thickness 
1.570 Had chipped dice 
Since 100 percent of the units failed because of misindexing, 
any of the other possible fa i lure  mechanisms were  anticlimactic. 
When a nonreject  (out of our  own supply) RTL NOR gate unit 
was opened and visually inspected under the microscope,  it w a s  d i s -  
covered that the type of wire  used f rom the die to the leads had been 
changed. 
unit had aluminum. 
purple plague. 
bonds, how ever . 
The RTL NOR gate re jec ts  had gold w i r e s  and the good 
No purple plague was found on the gold aluminum 
The change was probably made to eliminate 
It was found f rom the analysis of the DTL flip flop that: 
6.570 Appeared to be good 
7.870 Failed because etchant had opened, o r  
foreign mat te r  had shorted out leads  
85.770 Failed because either one o r  both of the input 
gates were disabled. 
Total 100.0% 
NOTE: The 7.870 were not pa r t  of the 85.7% group. 
The 85.770 group can be broken down into the following 
percentages of that group alone: 
71.3% Were caused by faulty masks  
16.7% Were caused by faulty handling 
12.0% Were caused by poor cleanup 
Total 100.0% 
14 
When the unit pictured in figure 20 was inspected, it was decided 
that a m o r e  extensive analysis of the affected aluminum leads was in 
order .  
y s i s  o r  actually scraping off some of the affected a r e a  and using x - ray  
diffraction methods to analyze the compound; however, this would be 
out of our present  scope of work and was not performed. 
This would involve either using an electron microscope anal-  
SECTION VI. CONCLUSIONS 
This experiment confirmed that the grea tes t  cause of fa i lure  was 
It was shown by microscopic examination that a very high bonding. 
percentage of internal leads had been bonded two o r  t h ree  t imes  to the 
subs t ra tes  land patterns before a good connection had been made. 
could only be detected on the aluminum to aluminum systems.  
gold to aluminum sys tems could and probably would, with tempera ture  
and age, exhibit purple plague, a n  intermetall ic formation which is high 
res i s t ive  to electron flow. 
This 
The 
The second grea tes t  offenders were  open and /o r  shorted aluminur 
interconnects. 
human handling. Pe r sons  handling these monolithic chips as they would 
a t rans is tor ,  with tweezers ,  caused complete opens o r  shor t s  by smear  
ing the aluminum interconnects. 
will not cause a complete open o r  shor t  but will with t ime cause in te r -  
mittent o r  complete failures.  
fa i lures  because they are  virtually undetectable by electr ical  functional 
testing . 
The most  frequent of these were  the e r r o r s  caused by 
Frequently these sc rapes  o r  s m e a r s  
These a r e  the most  f rustrat ing of all 
Other e r r o r s  which lead to open o r  highly res i s t ive  aluminum 
interconnects are  too thin a layer  a t  a silicon step-up o r  stepdown, 
poor adherence of aluminum to the si l icon, and fai lure  to remove all 
surface contaminants which w i l l  cause sublimation, as corrosion of 
the aluminum. 
Other fa i lure  modes detected were  chipped dice,  poor mask  
alignment and defects in both the silicon mater ia l  and the mask ,  all of 
which could cause electr ical  shorts o r  opens internal to the silicon. 
A s  is clear ly  seen,  most  of these faults,  whether detectable by 
e lec t r ica l  t es t s  o r  not, could be clearly found if  a microscopic exami- 
nation occurred  a f te r  bonding the silicon die  to the header.  Therefore ,  
e lectr ical  testing and microscopic examination pr ior  to the attachment 
of the header to facilitate a hermetic s e a l  could revea l  over  90 percent  
of the fai lures  encountered. 
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